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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
STATE OF UTAH
ARTHUR JACKETT,
C^nirt of Appeals
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 880040-CA

vs.
LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF
WATER AND POWER,

Category 14(b)

Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, LOS ANGEtES DEPARTMENT
OF WATER AND POWER

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h)
(1987).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
granting defendant's motion to dismiss and thereby dismissing
plaintiff's complaint, with prejudice.
The order of dismissal, filed October 14, 1987,
appears in the record on appeal at page 50.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
In this matter involving a California resident as
plaintiff verses a California governmental entity as defendant,
did the district court abuse its discretion when it applied as
a matter of comity, the appropriate California Governmental
Claims Act Statute of Limitations?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury suit wherein Mr. Arthur
Jackett seeks damages for injuries allegedly suffered when
the helicopter in which he was riding was forced to make an
emergency landing.

The helicopter was allegedly owned by the

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, who is the only
named defendant in this suit.

At the time of the accident Mr.

Jackett was a resident of the State of California and the Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power was a California
Governmental Entity.
In California, as in Utah, before an action can be
commenced against a governmental entity certain conditions must
be met.

Pursuant to the California Governmental Claims Act

after the appropriate notice provisions are met the claimant
has a period of two years from the date of the injury within
which to file his complaint.

Mr. Jackett timely filed his

notice of claim in California, but failed to commence his suit
within two years of the date of injury and so, on April 25,
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1987, Mr. Jackett's claim became time-barred in California.
Two months later he filed a complaint in Utah.
In lieu of an answer, defendant, the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (hereinafter "the Department")
filed a motion to dismiss.

The Department argued that as a

matter of comity, the Utah District Court should recognize and
apply the California Governmental Claims Act, which time-barred
Jackett1s action.

The district court granted the motion.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMEN^1

This is a clear and obvious cafee of forum shopping.
After having timely filed the appropriate notice of claim
required under the California Governmental Claims Act,

in

apparent preparation to initiate suit in California, Mr.
Jackett failed to timely file a complaint within the California
two year statute of limitations.

Two motiths after his cause of

action was time-barred in California, Mr. Jackett filed his
complaint in Utah.

The United States Supreme Court has

acknowledged that state courts have both the right and the
power to recognize and apply at their discretion the
appropriate sovereign immunity laws of sister states as a
matter of comity and to thereby eliminate such forum shopping.
That is exactly what the district court did in this case.
On appeal it is Mr. Jackettfs burden to establish
that the district court abused its discretion which in Utah
requires that he establish that the disttict judge acted
unreasonably, capriciously, and arbitrarily.

3

No such showing

has been made and therefore, the district court's order of
dismissal should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
WHETHER TO RECOGNIZE, AS A MATTER OF COMITY,
A SISTER'S STATE'S LAW REGARDING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IS A MATTER WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Although a matter of first impression in Utah, the
issues presented by this case have been dealt with by several
state and federal courts including the United States Supreme
Court.

In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)

the Supreme

Court determined that the states are not constitutionally
required to recognize or apply a sister's state's sovereign
immunity law in their own courts.

However, the Court then

recognized that although states are not constitutionally
required to acknowledge each other's sovereign immunity, they
are free to do so:
It may be wise policy, as a matter of
harmonious interstate relations for States
to accord each other immunity or to respect
any established limits on liability. They
are free to do so.
Id. at 426 (Emphasis added.)

Following Nevada v. Hall,

various state and federal courts have exercised their
discretion and have sometimes decided to acknowledge a sister
state's sovereign immunity law and sometimes not.

See, Lee

v. Miller County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1986);
Newberry v. Georgia Department of Industry and Trade, 33 6
S.E.2d 464 (S.C. 1985); Ramsden v. State of Illinois, 695
S.W.2d 457 (MO. 1985); Simmons v. State of Montana and State
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of Oregon, 670 P.2d 1372 (Mont. 1983); Paulus v. State of
South Dakota, 201 N.W. 867 (N.D. 1924) all holding that a
private citizen's suit against a sister state was properly
dismissed by the trial court based on thfe application, as a
matter of comity, of that sister state's sovereign immunity
law; but see, Mianecki v. Second Judicial District Court,
658 P.2d 422 (Nev. 1983); Ehrlich-Bober & Company, Inc.,
v. University of Houston, 404 N.E.2d 726 (N.Y. 1980) each
affirming the trial court's discretionary decision not to apply
a sister state's sovereign immunity law as a matter of comity.
None of the cases cited above, or those cited in
appellant's brief, and no cases located by respondent hold or
even suggest that the trial court lacks the power or the right
to exercise its discretion with regard to the application of a
sister state's sovereign immunity law.

On the contrary,

beginning with Nevada v. Hall, courts haVe recognized that
when it comes to principals of comity eabh case should be
judged on its own facts and the decision left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.

In that regard, the court in

Mianecki, supra, stated:
The principal is appropriately invoked
according to the sound discretion of the
court acting without obligation.
658 P.2d at 425. Again, in Lee v. Mille^r County, Arkansas,
supra, the United States Court of Appealb for the Fifth
Circuit recognized that the decision to extend comity rested
with the trial court:
At the outset, we note that in Texas the
decision to extend comity rests in the
5

sound discretion of the trial court.
Unless the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to extend immunity
to Miller County we must therefore allow
that refusal to stand. We are not free to
substitute our own judgment for that of the
district court.
800 F.2d at 1376.
Entrusting the decision to extend comity to sister
states to the sound discretion of the trial court is
appropriate.

There is no other viable alternative.

As is

discussed infra at 9 - 12 the court must consider the
peculiar facts of each case, the public policies involved, the
impact on the orderly administration of justice, the state of
residence of the parties involved and the extent to which forum
shopping has occurred or might be discouraged if comity is
extended to a sister state.

If such matters are not entrusted

to the discretion of the trial court each decision will be
appealable and each appeal will involve the reviewing court in
a detailed assessment of the facts of each case.

Comity, like

so many matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial
court, is inherently a matter which must remain flexible and
thereby responsive to the particular needs of each separate
case.
This being a matter entrusted to the sound discretion
of the trial court, this Court should not reverse absent a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.

In American Salt

Company v. W. S. Hatch Company, 748 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1987) the
Court succinctly described the standard for review:
The general rule concerning abuse of
discretion is that "this [C]ourt will
6

presume that the discretion of the trial
court was properly exercised unless the
record clearly shows the contrary."
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 1068. While considering another matter left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, chahge of venue, the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of Anderson v. Johnson, 1 Utah.2d
400, 268 P.2d 427 (1954) explained what constitutes an abuse of
discretion:

"The trial court's ruling on such a matter will

not be considered to have been an abuse of discretion unless
the court acted unfairly, or by whim or caprice or practically
denied justice in the case.

Id. at 430.

Lastly, it is clear that it is appellant's burden to
establish an abuse of discretion.

Id.

POINT II
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. IN FACT, THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DECISION WAS PROPER UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The Department does not contend that the district
court, or this court, is obligated by Utah law, by California
law, or by federal law to acknowledge the limitations
California has adopted which restrict its general waiver of
sovereign immunity.

Rather, it is the department's position

that Utah courts should, as a matter of comity to a sister
state, recognize and defer to California's law regarding its
own sovereign immunity.

In that context, several courts have

attempted to defined comity.

In Ramsderl v. State of

Illinois, supra, the court noted that:
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Comity has been defined as being "a matter
of courtesy, complaisance, respect - not of
right but of deference and good will."
(Citations omitted.) In Ehrlich-Bober &
Company v. University of Houston, 49
N*Yo2d 574, 427 NeYeS.2d 604, 608, 404
N.£.2d 726, 730 (1980), the court stated:
"The doctrine of comity 'is not rule of law
but one of practice, convenience and
expediency.' It does not of its own force
compel a particular course of action.
Rather, it is an expression of one state's
entirely voluntarily decision to defer to
the policy of another. Such a decision may
be perceived as promoting uniformity of
decision, as encouraging harmony among
participates in a system of cooperative
federalism, or is merely an expression of
hope for reciprocal advantage in some
future case in which the interests of the
forum are more critical. (Citations
omitted.)"
695 S.W.2d at 459.

Comity is an expression of federalistic

courtesy.
The Department does not suggest that comity should be
extended blindly, without regard to the public policies of the
State of Utah.

Both what is to be gained and what is to be

lost by extending comity must be considered.
Other courts considering whether to extend comity
have focused on whether the public policies of their respective
states will be contravened if comity is extended.

See, Lee

v. Miller County, Arkansas, 800 F.2d at 1378 (wherein the
court stated:

"In all but one of the cases in which a court

refused to extend immunity as a matter of comity, it was clear
that extending immunity would do violence to the public policy
of the forum state."); see also, Mianecki, supra, 658
P.2d at 425; Newberry, supra, 336 S.E.2d at 465.
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In this

case extending comity will not contravene the public policies
of the State of Utah.

Utah, like California, recognizes a

special statute of limitations when governmental entities are
involved as defendants.

Curiously, both Utah's and

California's Governmental Entity Statute of Limitations are, in
respects pertinent to this case, identical.
years.

Both are two

See California Governmental Claims Act at

§945.6(a)(1) and (2); Utah Code Ann. §63^30-13 and §63-30-15
(1987).

By extending comity, the district court has

acknowledged that a California governmental entity has the same
right as a Utah governmental entity to gpvern when and how it
chooses to waive its sovereign immunity.

A Utah governmental

entity in a California court would expect no less.
This is not a case such as Hall v. Nevada, where
extending comity would have provided greater immunity in
California courts for the State of Nevada than would be
extended to the State of California itself.
503 P.2d 1363, 1365 - 1366 (Cal. 1972).

Hall v. Nevada,

Nor is this a case

such as Mianecki, supra, where the Nevada court
determined that extending comity would provide immunity to a
Wisconsin governmental entity under circumstances that a Nevada
governmental entity having allegedly committed the same tort
would not enjoy immunity.

658 P.2d at 424. Rather this is a

case similar to Newberry, supra, where the court noted
that plaintiff was attempting to circumvent the laws of one
state by initiating an action in another and concluded that
although extending comity would result in the dismissal of
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plaintiff's claim, more important public policies militated in
favor of comity:
The court of appeals rejected the argument
that the principals of comity and public
policy should foreclose this case. We
disagree. While it is true that this court
has established a policy of giving redress
for tortuous wrongs, there are other
overriding policy considerations which
compel us to refuse to entertain
respondent's action.
First, as suggested earlier, the opinion of
the court appeals would lead to forum
shopping. Although suit in tort could not
be brought in Georgia, a plaintiff could
circumvent Georgia's immunity by bringing
suit in this state.
Second, allowing this type of suit would
cause tension between the states and
further degrade sovereign immunity.
Finally, there are practical problems
enforcing the judgment in this case.
Georgia could refuse to recognize the
judgment within its boarders and pull its
investments out of South Carolina in order
to avoid levy in this case. See Nevada
v. Hall, (Rhenquist, J., descending.)
336 S.E.2d at 465.

Furthermore, there is another important

factor which distinguishes this case from all of the cases
where comity was not extended and which further supports
extending comity.

Jackett was and still is a resident and

citizen of the State of California.

The Department did not

seek to impose California law upon a Utah citizen, but rather
asked the district court to recognize California's right to
control its sovereign immunity with regard to its own
citizens.

The court in Paulus, supra, noted at several

places in its opinion that it was of primary importance that
the plaintiff was attempting to circumvent his own state's,
10

(South Dakota), laws in a North Dakota court.

Paulus 201

N.W. at 870. Again, in Hall v. University of Nevada, the
California Supreme Court distinguished tftat case from
Paulus on the basis that Hall did not involve a citizen
of another state:
In holding that as a matter of comity the
North Dakota courts should not exercise
jurisdiction over its sister state, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota relied in
part on the fact that the plaintiff was a
citizen of South Dakota, and to this extent
the case is distinguishable because the
plaintiffs herein are California citizens.
503 P.2d at 1365. No Utah governmental Entity would accept or
expect that after receiving notice of claim, rejecting the
claim, then closing the matter after the running of the
appropriate statute of limitations, a California court would
subsequently allow a Utah citizen to circumvent his own state's
requirements when that state's requirements are identical to
California's.

Likewise, the Department should be protected as

a matter of comity from such a result.
Jackett argues that the court should ignore comity
in favor of certainty for the litigants and that in all
instances the four year statute of limitations provision should
apply in Utah.

Certainty is a laudablefroal,but it need not

be accomplished at the expense of harmonious interstate
relations and need not encourage forum shopping.

All matters

entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court
necessarily include an element of uncertainty.

That

uncertainty is generally diminished when courts reviewing the
trial court's discretionary decisions offer guidelines in their
11

opinions.

Likewise, in this case, this Court can reduce

whatever uncertainty might exist by affirming the trial court's
decision and by holding that future courts should consider
whether extending comity in a given case will contravene the
public policies of the State of Utah; whether extending comity
will discourage or encourage forum shopping; whether extending
comity will aid a sister state in maintaining control of its
sovereign immunity; whether extending comity in a given case
would be what a Utah governmental entity would expect in a
sister state under like circumstances and whether extending
comity will promote fundemental fairness and justice.

After

balancing such factors if the district court believes that
extending comity is inappropriate, it should exercise its
discretion and decline to do so.

In this case, however, the

district court accurately assessed the situation and determined
that comity should be extended.

In light of all of the factors

discussed in all of the cases cited herein, the district
court's decision

cannot be said to have been an abuse of

discretion and, in fact, cannot be said to have been improper
under any standard of review.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Department respectfully
requests this court to affirm the district court's order of
dismissal.
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